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A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO  
PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE
Alexander R. Pruss
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot ac-
tualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdo-
ings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds 
w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never 
chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these 
worlds is a world that God can actualize.
1. Introduction
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) is an argument that possibly the 
truth values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are such that 
God cannot actualize a morally perfect world. A “morally perfect world” 
is a world where at least one created agent has a libertarian-free choice 
between something wrong and something not wrong (“is significantly 
free”) and where no created agent does anything wrong. If God cannot 
create a morally perfect world but can instead actualize a very good, but 
morally imperfect, world containing created significantly free agents, he 
will be justified in actualizing some such world. Therefore, if Plantinga’s 
FWD succeeds, possibly God actualizes a world containing a moral evil, 
and so the existence of God is logically compatible with the existence of 
evil, which refutes the deductive argument from evil.
According to standard Molinism, which Plantinga’s FWD in the Nature of 
Necessity1 does assume, CCFs have non-trivial, and at least typically contin-
gent, truth values. I shall assume standard Molinism, and argue that there 
is a pair of possible worlds, w1 and w2, each of which is morally perfect and 
which are such that, necessarily, God can actualize w1 or God can actualize 
w2 (or both). Consequently, the claim in Plantinga’s FWD that, possibly, God 
1Alvin Plantinga, Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford, 1974). In Alvin Plantinga, “Self-
Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), 
49–52, Plantinga seems to attempt to give a version of the FWD that will be acceptable to 
non-Molinists. However, as Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and The Existence of God (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 136ff. has argued, this attempt fails. For instance, 
if all the relevant CCFs are necessarily false, then Plantinga’s account in “Self-Profile” im-
plies that God cannot weakly actualize any world containing free agents. For, to do that, 
God would have to cause something that counterfactually implies that the agents act as 
they do, and that would require a true CCF.
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cannot actualize a morally perfect world is false, if standard Molinism is 
true. Plantinga’s FWD is based on the possibility of transworld depravity. 
Roughly speaking, transworld depravity says that every possible person 
is such that were she created in any context that God could create her in, 
either she would never have significant freedom or she would do wrong 
at some time. The argument I shall give directly shows that transworld 
depravity is impossible.
In the next section, I will give some crucial preliminaries, including 
arguing for a controversial counterfactual Domination Principle inspired 
by an example of Plantinga’s. In the subsequent section, I will construct 
the pair w1 and w2 and argue on the basis of the Domination Principle that 
God can actualize at least one of them, assuming standard Molinism. I 
will then consider some objections. Finally, I will discuss some options 
for free will defenses that are not affected by the objections. I am inclined 
to think the problem lies not so much with free will defenses as such, but 
with Molinism.
2. crucial Preliminaries
2.1 ccfs
By stipulation, a CCF is a subjunctive conditional of the form c → f where c 
is an “appropriate antecedent for f” and f reports that a created agent did or 
did not freely choose something at a given time.2 Oddly enough, although 
it is traditional to use the word “counterfactual” for c → f, no assumption 
that c is false is made. It is somewhat difficult to characterize what an “ap-
propriate antecedent for f” is. Plantinga’s characterization is that c is the 
conjunction of all the states of affairs that God “strongly actualizes,” where 
God strongly actualizes s provided that God causes s and every contingent 
state of affairs that is “included in” (entailed?) by s.3 Another characteriza-
tion is that c reports all the events in the temporal sequence of a world 
right up to the choice that f describes, including the fact that a free choice 
takes place, but not including any information on what the agent in fact did 
choose, or anything that follows from that.4 In particular, the appropriate 
antecedents will include all the considerations operative for the agent in 
the choice and all the causal factors affecting the choice. I shall also assume 
that only propositions that are possibly true are appropriate antecedents, 
and whether an antecedent is appropriate to f is not a contingent matter.
Standard Molinism then says that CCFs have truth values independent-
ly of God’s activity, and God knows these truth values and can make use of 
2To reduce verbiage, I shall assume that if C → f is a CCF, so is C → ~f. This means that 
a double, triple, etc. negation of a proposition reporting what someone did or did not freely 
choose also counts as a proposition reporting what someone did or did not freely choose.
3Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” 49.
4Cf. for instance Thomas Flint, divine Providence: The molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1998) and Richard Otte, “Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable 
Worlds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological research 78 (2009), 165–177.
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them in deciding which antecedents to actualize.5 But just to say this much 
is not enough to be a standard Molinist. For instance, Robert M. Adams,6 
a paradigmatic anti-Molinist, thinks that CCFs have truth value indepen-
dently of God’s will, because, possibly with some exceptions (one of which 
will actually be central to the argument for the Domination Principle), 
they are simply false. I shall characterize standard Molinism by saying that 
(a) God knows the truth values of CCFs, (b) God can act on these truth 
values, and (c) the Conditional Law of Excluded Middle (CLEM) holds as 
restricted to CCFs.
Unrestricted CLEM is the claim that, necessarily, p → q or p → ~q, for all 
p and q (to be distinguished, of course, from the claim that p → (q or ~q), 
which is trivial at least if p is possible). While one might argue for stan-
dard Molinism on the basis of CLEM, unrestricted CLEM is usually taken 
to be implausible. Surely it is neither the case that were aliens to have in-
scribed a giant six digit integer on the far side of moon, then that integer 
would be even, nor that if they were to do that, then the integer would be 
odd. However, the standard Molinist accepts CLEM in the special case of 
conditionals of the form c → f where f reports what a created person does 
or does not freely choose and c is sufficiently determinate—and all the 
“appropriate” antecedents will count as sufficiently determinate.
2.2 dominance
Plantinga has offered the following interesting argument against those 
who deny truth values to CCFs. Suppose that Mayor Curley Smith has ac-
cepted a bribe of $35,000 to drop his opposition to a bill. Plantinga writes:
Let us ask . . . whether he would have accepted a bribe of $36,000, every-
thing else being as much as possible like the actual world. Here the answer 
seems fairly clear: indeed he would have.7
Thus:
(1) Smith is offered $36,000 → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.
And so at least one conditional of free will (though perhaps not a CCF in 
our present terminology as the antecedent may not be sufficiently deter-
minate) is true. Interestingly, even Adams, though generally opposed to 
Molinism, accepts this example, albeit holding that (1) is made true by the 
facts of Smith’s actual choice.8
5I will use the assumption that God knows these conditionals only in one place in the 
argument. Even without the assumption, the conclusion follows that, necessarily, there is 
a state of affairs that God could actualize that is such that were God to actualize it, there 
would be a morally perfect world. However, the assumption is needed to yield the claim 
that God knows how to identify that state of affairs—for what that state of affairs is will 
depend on the actual truth values of CCFs.
6Robert M. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14 (1977), 109–117.
7Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 177.
8Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 115.
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Now, notice that we would not accept (1) in every case in which Smith 
has accepted a $35K bribe—Plantinga rightly needs to assume that the 
larger bribe is offered in circumstances as much as possible like the ones 
with the smaller bribe. For instance, if state law has a higher penalty for 
accepting a bribe over $35K, it might well be the case that although Smith 
accepted $35K, he wouldn’t have risked accepting $36K. Likewise, it could 
be that Smith has found a way of laundering $35K which wouldn’t work 
for $36K, or Smith has a special liking for numbers that are divisible by 
seven. Of course, when we are pulled to say that (1) is true, we are assum-
ing none of these situations occur. Thus, what we are really committed to 
is this:
(2) If any consideration in favor of taking the smaller bribe would apply 
at least as well to the larger and any consideration there would be 
against taking the larger bribe also in fact applied at least as well to 
the smaller, and if Smith prefers more money to less money, then: 
Smith is offered a larger bribe → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.
Now, (2) is a consequence of a Categorical Domination Principle, which 
I submit we should accept as explaining (1) and (2). To introduce this prin-
ciple, we need a notion of one set of circumstances dominating another 
in respect of a choice. One way to define it is as follows. c* dominates c 
for x choosing A if and only if: (a) c* counts as an alternative to c, so that 
the choice it describes x as having before her is spatiotemporally located 
just as in c, between the same options as in c, and both c and c* include 
the same laws of nature (more conditions may need to be added here), (b) 
every consideration included in c in favor of x choosing A is present in 
c* with at least as great a force in favor of x choosing A, (c) every consid-
eration in c* against x choosing A is present in c with at least as great a 
force against x choosing A, and (d) either (i) some consideration is present 
in c* in favor of choosing A that either isn’t present in c or does not favor 
A in c or favors A less in c than it does in c* or (ii) some consideration is 
present in c against choosing A that either isn’t present in c* or does not 
count against A in c* or opposes A less in c* than it does in c. If we like, 
we might add the condition that the agent has no inclination to act unrea-
sonably for the sake of acting unreasonably.
I shall only use the notion of domination for “appropriate” antecedents 
c and c*, and I shall take it that appropriate antecedents are sufficiently 
determinate that whether c* does or does not dominate c is not a contin-
gent matter. Our principle now is:
(CDP) Necessarily: If (a) c and c* are antecedents appropriate to <x 
freely chooses A>, (b) c* dominates c for x choosing A, (c) c ob-
tains, and (d) x freely chooses A, then c* → (x freely chooses A).
Here, <. . .> is shorthand for “the proposition that . . .”. I call this principle 
“categorical,” because condition (d) talks of what x freely chooses, rather 
than what x would freely choose.
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The “considerations” mentioned in the definition of domination are 
subjective in nature. What exactly they are depends on one’s theory of 
action, but they are meant to be all the subjective factors that influence 
the action. Candidates include one or more of: motives, desires, choice-
relevant beliefs, subjective reasons, inclinations, etc.
The randomness objection to libertarian views of freedom holds that 
insofar as our choices are not determined by the considerations, they are 
random in a way that is incompatible with our responsibility. The most 
promising approach to responding to the randomness objection appears 
to be to hold that choices are always made because of considerations, even 
when the choices are not determined by these considerations.9 Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how something can be a choice when it does not come from 
considerations. Moreover, there is a long-standing philosophical tradition 
that we choose under the guise of the good, a tradition that is common 
ground for many libertarians and compatibilists. But a part of what it is to 
choose under the guise of the good is to be moved in one’s choice by the 
apparent goodness of the options. And hence those who accept the guise 
of the good thesis are apt to also agree that our choices are made because 
of considerations. Granted, there is also a tradition, of which William 
James is perhaps the most famous exponent, on which free choices are ul-
timately reasonless. I shall simply assume that this tradition is mistaken.
But if choices are made because of considerations, libertarians, whether 
Molinist or not, should accept CDP. For, plausibly, a part of what one is 
saying when one says that an action was chosen because of the consider-
ations in favor of the action is that the strength of the considerations in fa-
vor of the action and the weakness of the considerations against the action 
explain the action. But an explanation should have some robustness to it. 
This robustness is plausibly provided by the idea that if the considerations 
in favor of the action had been stronger and/or the considerations against 
the action had been weaker, and otherwise the circumstances remained 
relevantly the same, the agent would a fortiori have performed the action. 
There is significant dialectical benefit to the libertarian’s accepting such 
a principle, in that it gives a counterfactual robustness to reasons-based 
explanations that helps answer the randomness objection.
Compare this case. A rope is rated for 800 pounds. If you attach a load 
greater than 800, but less than 2000, pounds, it may or may not break—
the outcome is indeterministic, with the probability of breakage steadily 
increasing with load. You hang 1000 pounds on the rope and it breaks. It 
would be very odd to say: “If you had hung more, maybe it wouldn’t have 
broken.” The intuition, surely, is that it would a fortiori have broken.
9For libertarian accounts that proceed in this way, see, for instance, Randolph Clarke, 
“Indeterminism and Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995), 125–138, or Robert 
H. Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford, 1996). For a defense of a compet-
ing approach, not compatible with what I am defending here, see for instance Stewart C. 
Goetz, “A Noncausal Theory of Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological research 49 (1988), 
303–316.
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Or consider this line of thought. Just before watching the game on 
television, Sally lays a wager of $100 on the Steelers to win. The Steelers 
lose. Sally says: “Had I wagered on the other team, I would have won 
the wager.” Now, the outcome of a football game depends on many free 
choices, and on typical accounts of appropriate antecedents for CCFs, 
Sally’s wager will be a part of the circumstances of these choices, even 
though it is clearly causally irrelevant (of course one can rig the case so 
it becomes relevant). The case supports the idea that changing a causally 
irrelevant aspect of the circumstances should not affect the truth value 
of a CCF. This idea is intuitively quite plausible. But if changing causally 
irrelevant circumstances should not affect the CCF, then, a fortiori, chang-
ing the circumstances in a way that strictly promotes the consequent of 
the CCF should not turn a true CCF into a false one. Admittedly, there are 
Molinists who think you can have “bizarre” combinations of CCFs,10 but 
it seems quite implausible that one could affect outcomes by doing things 
that are causally irrelevant to the outcomes.
The above line of thought is compatible with the idea that if you knew 
the considerations ahead of time, you would have predicted that the agent 
would probably have acted differently. The agent may make an objective-
ly unlikely choice, acting on the basis of what is objectively a minor consid-
eration. But even when the agent acts in an unlikely way on the basis of 
a minor consideration, her action is still explained by that consideration, 
and the explanation can still have counterfactual robustness: if that minor 
consideration were stronger, the agent would still have acted on it.
It’s worth noting that CDP is particularly plausible given the Lewis-
Stalnaker account of counterfactuals, since a world where one makes the 
same decision on account of the same considerations appears closer than 
a world where one not only makes a different decision but one acts against 
the very considerations that had moved one in the actual world. Thus the 
non-molinist libertarian who accepts Lewis-Stalnaker semantics seems, in 
fact, to be committed to CDP by this line of thought. The Molinist will not 
be impressed by this argument, because either she rejects Lewis-Stalnaker 
semantics or takes the truth values of counterfactuals to be prior to simi-
larity relations, but the argument is sufficient to at least show that CDP is 
compatible with libertarianism—that it does not, for instance, presuppose 
that actions are determined by reasons.
And of course, it is possible that in the dominating circumstances c*, 
x chooses otherwise than A, just as it is possible that in the original cir-
cumstances c, x chooses otherwise than A. CDP is compatible with these 
claims. But given that x in fact chooses A in c, CDP claims that x would 
have chosen A in c* as well as in c.
Now, consider the following modified principle which I will call sim-
ply the “Domination Principle”:
10E.g., see Flint, divine Providence, 208.
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(DP) Necessarily: If (a) c and c* are antecedents appropriate to <x free-
ly chooses A>, (b) c* dominates c for x choosing A, and (c) c → (x 
freely chooses A), then c* → (x freely chooses A).
The reasons for accepting CDP are, I think, reasons for accepting DP as 
well. However, I can also give an explicit argument for DP from CDP un-
der the simplifying assumption that it is within God’s power to make c 
obtain and it is within God’s power to make c not obtain. It is very plau-
sible that if DP holds with this simplifying assumption, it also holds with-
out it, but in any case in the anti-FWD application we will need DP for, 
this simplifying assumption will be satisfied. (The simplifying assump-
tion may fail in cases where c itself involves prior creaturely free choices.)
Suppose that conditions (a)–(c) of DP are satisfied at a world w, and 
assume CDP, and suppose that both c and its denial are within God’s 
power. Let f be <x freely chooses A>. For a reductio, suppose that it is not 
true at w that c* → f. For the sake of brevity, assume that w is the actual 
world. So, we have (c → f) & ~(c* → f). Now, were c to hold, then (c → f) 
& ~(c* → f) would still hold. For it is within God’s power to make c hold, 
but according to standard Molinism it is not within God’s power to affect 
the truth values of CCFs with appropriate antecedents, and if the truth 
values of c → f or of c* → f would have been different had c held, then 
God would have had the power to affect the truth values of CCFs, namely 
by making or not making c hold. Therefore:
(3) c → ((c → f) & ~(c* → f)).
Now, I will make use of three axioms about counterfactuals with possi-
bly true antecedents (recall that all “appropriate” antecedents are possibly 
true):
(4) If p → q, then p → (p&q).
(5) If p → q and necessarily (q if and only if r), then p → r.
(6) Necessarily: If p and p → q, then q.
It is a very easy exercise to see that from (3)–(6) we can derive:
(7) c → (c & f & (c → f) & ~(c* → f)).11
Now, neither domination nor appropriateness of antecedents are con-
tingent matters. Therefore, conditions (a) and (b) in CDP hold necessarily 
if they hold at w (which we assumed was the actual world), and so CDP 
tells us that:
(8) Necessarily: If c & f, then c* → f.
11By (3) and (4), we have c → (c & (c → f) & ~(c* → f)). By (6), we have necessarily: c 
& (c → f) if and only if c & f & (c → f). Applying (5) and the fact that c → (c & (c → f) & 
~(c* → f)), we obtain (7).
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Therefore:
(9) Necessarily: c & f if and only if c & f & (c* → f).
By (5), (7) and (9) we get:
(10) c → (c & f & (c* → f) & (c → f) & ~(c* → f)).
But the consequent of (10) is contradictory, and plausibly a counter- 
factual with possible antecedent and impossible consequent is always 
false. Hence, we have an absurdity, and so the assumption that c* → f is 
not true at w (which for convenience we took to be the actual world) must 
be rejected. And, thus, DP is true.
3. The construction
Consider a family w of worlds at each of which God creates Eve, an apple 
and a dancing ground. At t1, Eve must freely choose between either eat-
ing the apple or dancing a jig. She cannot do both and she cannot fail to 
choose one of these two options.12 These facts are going to be all a part of 
all the relevant appropriate antecedents. Let A = <At t1 Eve chooses to eat 
the apple>, and J = <At t1 Eve chooses to dance the jig>. Moreover, in the 
worlds in w, this is the only free choice any creature ever gets, and the 
laws of nature are deterministic except for that choice. In all the worlds in 
w, Eve wants to eat the apple on account of its yumminess and to dance 
the jig on account of merriness. In none of the worlds in w is Eve in any 
way motivated by a desire to act contrary to the will of God as such or 
inclined to act unreasonably, but Eve does have a motivation, though not 
an overwhelming one, to obey God. There are no other relevant desires (in 
some subsequent discussions, this condition will be relaxed).
Now, consider a world wJ in w. In wJ, God forbade Eve to eat the apple 
(I stipulate that whenever I talk of prohibitions, the agent under the pro-
hibition is aware of the prohibition), and Eve chose to dance the jig. Let 
c be the antecedent appropriate to J in wJ. This will presumably include 
God’s forbidding Eve from eating the apple, the apple’s looking yummy 
to Eve, and Eve’s enjoying jigs, as well as other relevant facts. Moreover, 
there is a world wA at which c also holds, but where, alas, Eve chooses to 
eat the apple.
Next, let wJ* be a world just like wJ, except that in wJ*, God forbade Eve 
to dance the jig instead of forbidding eating the apple, but Eve still chose 
to dance the jig just as in wJ. Let c* be the antecedent appropriate to J in 
wJ*. This will be very much like c, except that instead of including God’s 
forbidding Eve from eating the apple, it includes God’s forbidding her 
12Thomas Flint notes that some libertarians will say that it is always possible simply to 
refrain from acting. If so, then modify the example. Eve has a choice whether to eat the apple 
or not. If she chooses not to eat the apple, a law of nature will determine her to dance a jig. 
She is no longer choosing between eating the apple and dancing a jig, but between eating 
the apple or acting in a way (viz., refraining from eating the apple) that necessitates her 
dancing a jig. The rest of the argument can adapt to this.
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from dancing the jig. Finally, let wA* be a world just like wJ*, with the same 
divine prohibition on dancing a jig, except that Eve eats the apple there.
I shall assume that Eve has a moral obligation—perhaps in virtue of 
benefits received or her relationship with God—to obey God. Thus, in wJ 
and wA, Eve is prohibited from eating the apple, whereas in wJ* and wA*, 
Eve is instead prohibited from dancing the jig.
Observe that both wJ and wA* are morally perfect worlds: there is sig-
nificant creaturely freedom, and nobody does wrong. I will now show 
that if standard Molinism holds, then God can actualize wJ or God can 
actualize wA*. All my premises will be necessary truths, and so the argu-
ment will establish (assuming standard Molinism) that, necessarily, God 
can actualize a morally perfect world, which is all I need to show to refute 
Plantinga’s FWD.
To see this, observe that if c → J, then God can actualize wJ by making c 
hold. And if c* → A, then God can actualize wA* by making c* hold. Hence, 
it suffices to show that c → J or c* → A. Moreover, if I can show this us-
ing only necessary truths as premises, then it will follow that transworld 
depravity is necessarily false, since Eve would either be significantly free 
and sinless were c to hold and were she to have no further opportunities 
for significantly free action, or else she would be significantly free and 
sinless were c* to hold and were she to have no further opportunities for 
significantly free action.
I will now show that c → J or c* → A by showing that if ~(c → J), then 
c* → A. To that end, suppose ~(c → J). Then, by CLEM as restricted to CCFs, 
c → ~J is true. Moreover, because according to c, Eve must choose between 
the jig and the apple, it follows that c → A is true. But c* dominates c in 
respect of Eve choosing to eat the apple. For, all the considerations present 
in c in favor of Eve’s eating the apple are also present in c* with equal 
strength: the apple is just as yummy in c* as in c, and Eve has no motiva-
tion to disobey God as such, so the fact that in c* Eve is not forbidden to eat 
the apple does not constitute a reason against eating the apple. Similarly, 
all the considerations present in c* against eating the apple are also pres-
ent in c with equal strength: the jig is just as merry in c as in c*, and Eve 
has no desire to disobey God as such. On the other hand, there is a consid-
eration in c against eating the apple that is not present in c*: according to 
c, God has prohibited eating the apple, and Eve has a motivation to obey 
God. Hence, indeed, we have domination. Since c → A, it follows by DP 
that c* → A. Hence, we have shown that if ~(c → J), then c* → A.
Thus, we have shown that God can actualize wJ or God can actualize wA*. 
Since both are morally perfect, it follows that God can actualize a morally 
perfect world. Moreover, all the premises in the argument were necessary 
truths. Hence, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world.
It is pretty intuitive that if Eve would eat the apple given c despite the 
prohibition, she would a fortiori eat the apple given c*. Granted, some-
times, the fact that something is prohibited may motivate one—think of 
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the use of “sinful” in advertising—but we have assumed that Eve does not 
suffer from that perversity.13
4. Objections
Objection 1: The construction supposes that it is wrong for Eve to disobey 
God. But, as Mark Murphy has argued at length,14 there is no duty for x 
to obey God absent a special relationship between God and x, and with-
out Eve having earlier been free, there is no way to ensure there is such a 
special relationship.
response: Rather than refuting Murphy’s argument, the simplest re-
sponse is just to modify the case to evade the objection. Instead of letting 
wA and wJ be worlds where God has forbidden eating the apple, let them be 
worlds where Eve knows that eating the apple causes (through some odd 
causal law) a severe harm to some non-consenting third party who does 
not deserve the harm (e.g., an Adam who is not significantly free). Then 
let wA* and wJ* be just like that, except this time it is the dancing of the jig 
that is known to cause the harm. It’s wrong to eat an apple or dance a jig 
simply on account of yumminess or merriment at the cost of severe harm 
to a third party, and the rest of the argument goes through. Similar cases 
can be multiplied.
Objection 2: Surely God has good reason to create a world with more 
than one significantly free creature. But the example in this paper only 
shows that God could create a world with one significantly free creature 
that never goes wrong.
response: The example generalizes. I will leave the details to the in-
terested reader, but sketch the idea. Consider worlds with n persons, 
E1, … ,  En. Each is facing a simultaneous and independent (maybe they are 
doing this in far-separated parts of Eden) choice whether to eat an apple 
or dance a jig, and each is either forbidden the apple or forbidden the jig. 
Now, there are 2n possible combinations of relevant divine prohibitions: 
maybe E1 is forbidden the apple, E2 the jig, and so on. We also assume 
that the prohibitions are individually and independently communicated 
to each person, so that what each person does is, plausibly (see also the 
discussion of CRP, below), counterfactually independent of any combina-
tion of others’ actions and of divine commands to others. DP then ensures 
that God can choose what to command Ei such that Ei would obey. If Ei 
is such that she would eat the apple were she forbidden it, then by DP, Ei 
would also eat the apple were she forbidden the jig instead, so God need 
only forbid the jig to Ei. And if Ei is not such that she would eat the apple 
were she forbidden it, and hence (by restricted CLEM) she is such that she 
would not eat the apple were she forbidden the apple, then God can safely 
forbid her to eat the apple. And, so, God can ensure that everybody makes 
the right significantly free choice.
13Cf. Otte, “Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable Worlds.”
14Mark Murphy, An Essay on divine Authority (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2002).
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Objection 3: Libertarians with whom I’ve discussed principles like CDP 
and DP have tended to deny them. One intuitive reason for the denial ap-
pears to be the Counterfactual Repeat Intuition:
(CRI) If an agent freely chooses A in circumstances c, then it is possible 
that if the memories of her choice and of its consequences were 
deleted and she were put for a second time in circumstances just 
like c, she would or at least might choose differently from how 
she did the first time.
response: I am happy to endorse CRI. But I do not know of a good argu-
ment from CRI to the denial of CDP. CDP does not talk of a repeat of c. It 
talks of the agent having instead been in c*.
Consider again the case of Sally who has wagered $100 on the Steelers 
and lost. I think we should affirm both of the following two claims:
(11) The Steelers would still have lost had Sally wagered on the other 
team.
(12) It is possible that had the memories of all the participants in the 
game been erased, and had they all been put in the same circum-
stances, the Steelers would or at least might have won.
We should affirm (11) because Sally’s wager was causally irrelevant. 
But we should also affirm (12) because the players could make different 
choices next time around. Thus it is quite possible to affirm instances of 
the CRI, while holding that in other but very similar circumstances, the 
agents would have acted the same way. Likewise it should be possible to 
hold that in dominating circumstances, the agents would have acted in 
the same way.
Objection 4: DP (and (1), CDP and CRP) involve a different kind of sub-
junctive conditional from that involved in DI and in Plantinga’s Molinist 
CCFs. For instance, perhaps, the conditionals in DP are Lewis-Stalnaker 
similarity-based conditionals or maybe Edgington-style conditional-prob-
ability conditionals,15 while the Molinist CCFs that God is guided by are 
sui generis, and this difference in the kinds of conditionals explains the 
clash in intuitions between those behind DI and those behind DP.
response: I think this objection is plausible, but fatal to Molinism if cor-
rect. The reason it is fatal to Molinism is that it leaves the Molinist con-
ditionals without a sufficiently robust connection to ordinary language. 
For instance, (1) is a paradigm example of the sort of conditional of free 
will that comes up in ordinary language. Indeed, I submit that in ordinary 
language, when we talk about what people would have done, we either are 
making probabilistic claims on the basis of similar circumstances they were 
in (conditional-probability conditionals) or else we are making claims, in-
formed by principles like CDP, about what people would have done, while 
keeping fixed as much as possible of their actual decision-making (this 
15Dorothy Edgington, “On Conditionals,” mind 104 (1995), 235–329.
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might be rather like Lewis-Stalnaker conditionals). Plantinga’s (1) is one of 
these last ones: we keep fixed as much as possible of Smith’s motivations 
for his choice when we move to the counterfactual scenario. If Molinist 
CCFs are completely different from these ordinary language subjunctive 
conditional claims about free choices, then, I submit, we really have no idea 
what the Molinist CCFs mean and why they would be relevant to divine 
decisions. If this is right, then the Molinist cannot deny CDP (and hence 
DP) without undercutting Molinism.
Objection 5: CDP is implausible in the case of patently unreasonable 
choices. For instance, suppose Jim chooses a searing pain of magnitude 
9 (on a 10 point scale) in place of a burning pain of magnitude 5, even 
though he prefers a smaller pain to a greater and has no belief that pain 
will make him stronger or the like. He just chooses that which he dis-
prefers. Let c be the actual appropriate antecedent. Let c* be a modified 
antecedent in a case where the searing pain has only magnitude 4, and the 
burning pain still has magnitude 5. Given Jim’s weirdness, it is far from 
clear that in c*, Jim would have chosen the searing pain, even though c* 
dominates c in respect of choosing the searing pain.
response: It is not clear whether Jim’s case is possible. In the case de-
scribed, Jim does not act on account of any considerations. In this regard, 
he differs from the masochist for whom the magnitude of pain may be a 
consideration in favor of the pain. Thus, if we take acting on considerations 
to be a necessary condition for making a choice, we need to dismiss Jim’s 
case as impossible. And if we modify the case to that of the masochist, then 
it becomes false that c* dominates c in respect of choosing the searing 
pain. If, on the other hand, we attribute to Jim an inclination to act patently 
unreasonably, then either the same response as in the case of the masochist 
works or else, as I suggested earlier, in the definition of domination we need 
only add the condition that the agent has no inclination to act unreasonably 
for its own sake.
Objection 6: It is possible, pace everything that has been said about the 
randomness objection to libertarianism, to make reasonless choices—
choices that do not come from any consideration.
response: I can grant this and still run a variant of the argument. Simply 
add an extra condition to the antecedents in the necessary conditional in 
DP that x is unable to make a reasonless choice. Maybe x is psychologically 
incapable of that, or maybe God makes it impossible for x. And then stipu-
late in the construction of my counterexample worlds that Eve is unable to 
make a reasonless choice. Granted, if normally people can make reasonless 
choices, this will restrict Eve’s freedom. But since she has two non-reason-
less options available to her, and one of them is wrong and the other isn’t, 
she is still significantly free. Our freedom typically is restricted in various 
ways. A choice between punching someone who insulted me and ignoring 
the insult can be significantly free even if I am psychologically incapable of 
smiling gently in response to the insult. What is needed is that the choice 
not be so restricted that there be no significant freedom left.
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The only real danger to the argument would be from a claim that not 
only are reasonless choices sometimes possible, but that they are always 
possible when an agent is facing a choice. This seems implausible. All 
sorts of restrictions on our freedom are possible. It is possible, for in-
stance, that one be psychologically incapable of choosing on the basis of 
aesthetic reasons. Why couldn’t one, then, be psychologically incapable of 
choosing reasonlessly?
Moreover, reasonless choices appear to be subject to the randomness 
objection against libertarianism. But if they are subject to the randomness 
objection, then reasonless choices are not something the agent is morally 
responsible for and are not free choices.
Objection 7: God may want more than a world where everybody is sig-
nificantly free and always does what is right: he may want a world where 
some creature makes a significantly free choice out of duty. In my examples 
of “morally perfect worlds,” Eve dances the jig or eats the apple because of 
the jig’s merriness or the apple’s yumminess. Granted, she is obligated to 
choose as she does, because the other choice is forbidden, but it does not 
seem that she chooses because of the obligation. It may still be that, given 
the contingent values of CCFs, God’s only way of getting a world where a 
creature acts significantly freely out of duty is to actualize a world where 
some (other or same) creature does wrong. (This suggestion was basically 
made by Michael Bergmann in correspondence.)
response: This objection amounts to a new Molinist FWD, not based 
on the possibility of transworld depravity but on the possibility that the 
CCFs preclude God from actualizing a world where both nobody does 
wrong and yet some creature acts significantly freely out of duty. A fuller 
evaluation of this FWD may well require a deeper analysis of the logic of 
CCFs as well as of the nature of motivation. After all, the counterexample 
to Plantinga’s FWD has shown that not all prima facie possible combina-
tions of truth values of CCFs are in fact possible: DP places a significant 
constraint on the combinatorics. There may be other such constraints, and 
if one wishes to give a fully satisfactory Plantinga-style defense, the onus 
of proof is now on one to show that the given combination of truth values 
of CCFs that one posits the possibility of is in fact possible.
However, a further response can be made. We can imagine an agent 
who has the property of motivational maximalism in respect of a decision: 
necessarily, when she chooses an action A, she acts on all the undefeated 
considerations that favor A (or disfavor non-A—I shall neglect this dis-
junct below). Her rationality is such that she is simply unable to ignore 
any considerations that she neither is choosing against nor has a defeater 
for. One might even think that all agents have motivational maximalism 
in their choices, but there is no need for that controversial, and probably 
false, assumption.
What I need here is that motivational maximalism is compatible with 
significant freedom, and this appears quite plausible. Now, then, simply 
add to my stories about Eve the assumption that she has motivational 
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maximalism and that she has a consideration in favor of doing her duty. 
Then, in these refined versions of wJ and wA*, Eve acts from all her consid-
erations in favor of the jig and the apple, respectively, and duty is among 
these considerations.
Now, maybe, this does not satisfy. For, maybe, God would want an 
agent not only to choose significantly freely, but to choose it solely out of 
duty. But it is not clear that this is all that desirable. It may well be the case 
that, necessarily, whenever one has a duty to do something, there is some 
other reason for the action which a virtuous agent will also be moved by. 
It is one’s duty to visit a sick friend, and virtuous agents act on their du-
ties. But the virtuous agent will visit her friend not just out of duty, but also 
out of a desire to be with her friend. If this kind of a choice with mixed 
motives is the best kind of choice, then there will be no special value in 
choosing something solely out of duty, and so God will have no special 
reason to prefer a world where somebody does that. And Eve’s motives 
of yumminess and merriness may well in fact be motives that a virtu-
ous person would have: a virtuous person appreciates perceptual goods 
and rejoices in good circumstances—we may even, if we so wish, add a 
theological significance to the yumminess and merriness (enjoying and 
rejoicing in God’s creation, respectively).
Or maybe the case I gave where Eve has motivational maximalism is 
unsatisfactory because the motivational maximalism is imposed on her 
by God, rather than a result of her formation of her own character. But 
further wielding of DP could, perhaps, ensure that Eve earlier achieved 
motivational maximalism through free choices. For instance, maybe prior 
to her apple/jig choice, she had a choice between a pear and a waltz, in 
which choice she had a consideration in favor of gaining motivational 
maximalism and none to the contrary, and the situation was set up so that 
she knew which one of her potential choices would lead to her character 
changing in a way that would make her have motivational maximalism. 
By choosing whether the causal connection to motivational maximalism 
is tied to the pear or to the waltz, God could ensure that Eve chose mo-
tivational maximalism and did so freely, at least if standard Molinism is 
compatible with freedom. And then God inserts the apple/jig choice, as in 
my original case.
The point of this response is not the rejection of all possible Molinist 
defenses along the lines of the “out of duty” suggestion. The point is sim-
ply to highlight that finding an alternative along these lines is not easy 
and requires significant additional effort going beyond Plantinga’s FWD.
Objection 8. Whenever one engages in a significantly free choice, one 
always has available to one the possibility of engaging in the wrong choice 
for the sake of rebelliously asserting one’s autonomy against God or the 
moral law. But it was crucial to the domination condition in the story 
about Eve that Eve had no reason to do wrong just because it was wrong.16
16This objection is due to Thomas Flint.
414 faith and Philosophy
response: While it is certainly possible to make such a demonic decision, it 
does not seem psychologically plausible that every significantly free choice 
has to include this possibility. A significantly free choice needs to include 
one option that is wrong and one option that is not wrong—nothing more. 
But while the theist can say in every wrongdoing one is at least implicitly 
rebelling against God, it is not plausible that in every wrongdoing one is 
acting as one does because the action is a rebellion against God. A person 
could cheat on her taxes to get money to buy a yacht or commit adultery 
to avoid loneliness or continue sinning out of a perversion of the desire to 
experience God’s grace (cf. Romans 6:1). Thus the notion of a significantly 
free choice does not require the possibility of such a demonic decision. 
And just as a significantly free individual can be blind to aesthetic reasons, 
she can also be blind to demonic reasons.
5. closing remarks
A FWD is an argument that possibly an omniscient, omnipotent and per-
fectly good being could create a world containing evil. If DP is true, then 
the most famous version of the FWD, Plantinga’s Molinist FWD, does not 
work. However, non-Molinist FWDs continue to have a chance of work-
ing. It was essential to the argument that God be in a position to choose 
between actualizing wJ and actualizing wA* on the basis of his knowledge 
of CCFs, and that required Molinism. If, for instance, CCFs have no truth 
values, or they are all false, or God only knows the truth values of a few 
CCFs and his knowledge is explanatorily posterior to his decision of which 
world to actualize, then the argument will fail to establish that God had 
the power to knowingly actualize a morally perfect world. Indeed, Adams 
has offered a defense based on such assumptions17 and Plantinga himself 
thought that it is easier to offer a FWD in the absence of Molinism.18 More-
over, FWDs that are not based on God’s possible inability to actualize a 
morally perfect world are unaffected.19
Plantinga’ thesis of the possibility of transworld depravity required an 
appropriate independence thesis for CCFs, such as that when c and c* are 
logically incompatible and appropriate, then c → f and c* → G are going to 
be logically independent. DP questions such independence assumptions. 
An interesting question would be to map out more of the logical struc-
ture of the space of CCFs. Is it, for instance, the case that all combinatorial 
combinations of truth-values of CCFs consistent with DP and some logical 
axioms about counterfactuals are possible? Or are there other substantive 
axioms that need to be added? The question is interesting in itself, and 
important to FWDs. It will, for instance, be relevant to a fuller evaluation 
17Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 90–91.
18Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Adams,” in Tomberlin van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga.
19For instance, Alexander R. Pruss, “A New Free-Will Defense,” religious studies 39 
(2003), 211–223.
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of Molinist defenses like the one discussed in the seventh objection in the 
preceding section.
The Molinist defender of Plantinga’s FWD should probably deny CDP 
and DP. In justification of this denial, she may very well be forced to accept a 
version of libertarianism on which free choices need not be explained, even 
indeterministically, by any considerations. This would allow the Molinist 
to hold that CCFs enjoy a logical independence from one another, so that, 
for instance, if c and c* are logically incompatible and appropriate, then 
c → f and c* → G are logically independent. It appears that Plantinga’s FWD 
requires some such logical independence thesis in order to ensure the pos-
sibility of the scenario where all the CCFs come out in a way that precludes 
God from actualizing a morally perfect world.20
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